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Case Note 
NEW APPROACHES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
GUARANTEE OF EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW 
Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General 
[2015] 1 SLR 26 (CA); [2013] 3 SLR 118 (HC) 
Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General 
[2013] 4 SLR 1059 (HC); [2012] 4 SLR 476 (CA) 
In a recent series of challenges to s 377A of the Penal Code 
(Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed), the courts have developed the 
jurisprudence on review of legislation under Art 12(1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 
1999 Reprint) (“the Constitution”). Both the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal set a very high (but not insurmountable) 
threshold, but each did so in a different manner due to 
differing conceptions of equality. A critical examination of 
both approaches shows that the courts’ conclusions are 
ultimately defensible more as a means of disposing of the 
instant case than as a watertight doctrinal foundation for 
Art 12(1) adjudication. The judgments also bring up other 
miscellaneous areas for further development. 
Benjamin Joshua ONG 
BA Jurisprudence (Oxon), BCL (Oxon). 
I. Introduction
1 Section 377A of the Penal Code1 criminalises male-male acts of
“gross indecency”. Against the backdrop of political debate in public fora
and in Parliament regarding whether or not s 377A should be repealed,
two attempts were made to have the courts declare it unconstitutional
for breach of the principle of equality before the law in Art 12 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore2 (“the Constitution”). The first
was by Tan Eng Hong, who was charged with an offence under s 377A
(though the charge was later amended to one under s 294(a) of the
Penal Code, which focused on the public nature of his sexual act rather
than the fact that it involved two males). The second was by Lim Meng
Suang and Kenneth Chee Mun-Leon, who sought to challenge s 377A
1 Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed. 
2 1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint. 
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simply on the basis of their being homosexual men. Both applications 
were dismissed by Quentin Loh J sitting as the High Court;3 these 
decisions were upheld upon a conjoined appeal (but on different 
grounds) by a unanimous Court of Appeal comprising Andrew Phang 
Boon Leong JA, and Belinda Ang Saw Ean and Woo Bih Li JJ.4 
2 Political interest in the outcome of the cases aside, these cases 
are noteworthy for containing some of the most detailed jurisprudence 
on Art 12(1) in particular and the judicial review of legislation in 
general: they were not simply a matter of applying settled law. Both 
courts struggled with the problem of how to formulate a test that would 
reserve to the courts a real power to identify and strike down the most 
objectionable laws, but not others which are a legitimate exercise of 
legislative power. In other words, these cases demonstrate the tension 
between the recent judicial adoption of the “green-light” model of the 
State5 and the much older statement that:6 
… [t]he courts, in upholding the rule of law in Singapore, will no 
doubt readily invalidate laws that derogate from the Constitution 
which is the supreme law of our land. 
3 Thus, while there are interesting debates to be had on the 
proper roles of the processes of prosecutorial discretion and 
adjudication by the courts in such polarising matters,7 as well as the 
broader issue of the interaction between morality and the law,8 this note 
is concerned with the doctrinal implications for Singapore’s equality law 
under Art 12(1). It seeks to add to existing work on this matter9 by, 
without expressing an opinion on the outcome of the case or the merits 
of s 377A, highlighting elements of the procedural history of the cases 
as well as the differing approaches, both explicit and implicit, taken by 
the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The author will explore 
each court’s approach, offering several possible doctrinal criticisms 
(but without commenting on whether they would necessarily have made 
                                                          
3 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118; Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-
General [2013] 4 SLR 1059. 
4 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26. 
5 See generally Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General [2014] 1 SLR 345, 
endorsing Chan Sek Keong, “Judicial Review – From Angst to Empathy” (2010) 
22 SAcLJ 469. For a summary, see Benjamin Joshua Ong, “Public Law Theory and 
Judicial Review in Singapore” Singapore Law Watch Commentary (December 
2013). 
6 Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489 at [89]. 
7 Lynette J Chua, “The Power of Legal Processes and Section 377A of the Penal 
Code” [2012] Sing JLS 457. 
8 Tham Lijing, “377A: Law and Morality” Singapore Law Gazette (January 2015) 
at p 21. 
9 Yap Po Jen, “Section 377A and Equal Protection in Singapore: Back to 1938?” 
(2013) 25 SAcLJ 630. 
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a difference to the outcome of the case) and ultimately concluding that 
the courts’ approaches are, in the light of the complexities involved, 
defensible mainly as a means of disposing of the instant case but not as a 
means of laying the foundations for future Art 12(1) issues in other 
cases. 
4 The issues raised by the judgments have proven to be so 
complex that organising this note has proven to be a challenge. 
Nonetheless, it is hoped that the following structure will be the most 
useful. The author will begin by examining the nature of the applicant’s 
claims,10 before beginning his analysis of the nature of equality and 
hence the test for constitutionality under Art 12(1) by examining the 
High Court’s approach.11 This will prove to require a more detailed look 
at the concept of legislative purpose,12 which will lay the groundwork for 
an examination of the Court of Appeal’s approach13 by considering but 
ultimately rejecting a possible solution to the issues with the High 
Court’s approach. The judgments also raise several miscellaneous side 
issues, which will be examined (in no particular order)14 before some 
concluding remarks are made.15 
II. The claims made by the applicants 
A. A novel type of claim 
5 Although two cases were heard as conjoined appeals by the 
Court of Appeal, it must be borne in mind that they were fundamentally 
different. Lim and Chee’s case was based on the effects of the very 
existence of s 377A: they said that it “reinforces … discrimination” and 
“social stigma” which, they said, made homosexuals “feel that they 
cannot be openly affectionate in public” and led to “discrimination in 
school and in the army”.16 
6 On the other hand, Tan’s case was, at least at first, based not on 
the existence, but rather on the application, of the law. Hence, one of the 
Court of Appeal’s main reasons for granting him leave to pursue the 
claim was the potential violation of his constitutional rights between his 
arrest and the amendment of the charge.17 Even in so far as the alleged 
                                                          
10 See paras 5–11 below. 
11 See paras 12–25 below. 
12 See paras 26–38 below. 
13 See paras 39–62 below. 
14 See paras 63–82 below. 
15 See paras 83–88 below. 
16 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [5]–[7]. 
17 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 at [151], [154] and [172]. 
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latent violation of rights caused by the very existence of s 377A was 
concerned, the court focused on the potential criminal charges faced by 
him in future, rather than on matters such as social stigma.18 The closest 
thing that came to a recognition of social stigma as a violation of a right 
known to the law was the observation that s 377A “affects the lives of a 
not insignificant portion of our community in a very real and intimate 
way”,19 but even then the court immediately went on to focus on the 
legal consequences of this (eg, victims of male-male domestic abuse 
being reluctant to report it for fear of being prosecuted) rather than the 
social ones. 
7 Seen in this light, Lim and Chee’s case was truly novel, in that it 
was one of the first allegations that a law could be rendered 
unconstitutional by virtue of its extra-legal effects, or at least its 
tendency to produce them. One might therefore think that the 
traditional framework of asking whether the statute’s classifying, and 
thus treating differently, legal subjects is (a) founded on an “intelligible 
differentia”; and (b) rationally linked to the purpose of classification 
(the “traditional test”)20 was fundamentally unsuitable to Lim and Chee’s 
case. This is because this framework has to do with whether the effects 
mandated by the statute qua law are constitutional, whereas Lim and 
Chee’s concerns were, at least in part, really about the effects occasioned 
by the statute qua sociological phenomenon. In other words, their claim 
was not about equality before the particular law in question (that is, 
equality before s 377A), but rather equality before the legal system 
(equality before the law, in the sense of the edifice of the legal system in 
totality as experienced by the legal subject). 
8 This view might shed some light on why the courts 
characterised the differentia as they did. On its face, s 377A targets male-
male sexual activity, not homosexuality itself. Thus, two heterosexual men 
who engage in sexual activity with one another would be caught by the 
law, but not two homosexual men who perform intimate, even sexual, 
acts not amounting to “gross indecency”. Yet Loh J held (and the Court 
of Appeal agreed)21 that the differentia was between “male homosexuals 
or bisexual males who perform acts of ‘gross indecency’ on another 
male” [emphasis added] and other persons22 – he read into the purpose 
of the statute a differentiation based on sexual orientation which is not 
evident from the face of the statute. 
                                                          
18 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 at [173]–[183]. 
19 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 at [184]. 
20 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 at [185]. 
21 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [111]. 
22 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [48]. 
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B. Were the claims legal or extra-legal? 
9 Thus, strictly speaking, the right that Lim and Chee sought to 
assert in court was not quite the same as the right on the basis of which 
Tan, and probably, by extension, they,23 had been granted locus standi. 
One might suspect that it is their novel contentions that prompted some 
apprehension by the Court of Appeal, which began its judgment with a 
warning that the court cannot “be sucked into and thereby descend into 
the political arena” [emphasis in original] by taking into account “extra-
legal considerations” instead of only “legal arguments”.24 On this view, 
as far as the Court of Appeal was concerned, the only permissible reason 
for challenging a criminal statute was fear of prosecution under it 
(and not, say, social stigma which it adds to). 
10 It is certainly true that, as the Court of Appeal noted, judicial 
fairness does not demand that the court start with a desired substantive 
outcome in mind and then twist the law to work towards it. The Court 
of Appeal’s judgment does, however, raise the issue of what exactly a 
“legal argument” is, given that the court has the power to apply and to 
change the law: there is an element of circularity in saying that the court 
can only consider legal arguments, given that, by definition, “legal” 
matters are simply those which a court of law may consider. It might, 
moreover, be the case that the law demands (or is changed so as to 
demand) that the courts take into account what would otherwise be 
“extra-legal considerations”. 
11 The upshot is that one cannot escape from the fact that the 
court has Kompetenz-Kompetenz, in that it itself determines what is 
“legal” and what is not: the phrase “legal argument” may well be a stand-
in for some unarticulated ideas of the proper relative roles of the various 
institutions and/or the content of the arguments. Therefore, Lim and 
Chee’s claim may be seen as being not only a claim brought to the court, 
but a claim about the court and its role in engaging with constitutional 
debates. The Court of Appeal’s response to this will be looked at more 
closely below.25 For now, the author will begin by examining the concept 
of equality and its implications for Loh J’s analysis. 
                                                          
23 The Attorney-General did not challenge Lim and Chee’s having locus standi when 
they came before the High Court, and made a challenge before the Court of Appeal 
but then withdrew it: Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [31]. 
24 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [6]–[12]. 
25 See paras 39–43 below. 
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III. The High Court’s approach: Legitimacy of legislative purpose 
A. The history of Art 12(1) 
12 Loh J, in describing the history of Art 12(1), said that it may be 
traced to (a) “English common law, which prohibits special privileges 
in favour of any individual and mandates the equal subjection of all 
classes of persons to the law”;26 and (b) the desire to prevent racial 
discrimination against black people in the US after the American Civil 
War.27 Thus, Art 12(1) was described as “includ[ing] a guarantee of 
substantive equality”;28 and, for Loh J, the problem lay in ensuring that 
formal inequality (eg, taxing high-income earners more than others),29 
which is not only permissible but necessary, was not used as a cloak for 
impermissible substantive inequality, which is contrary to the goal of 
establishing an “egalitarian society”.30 (The issue of exactly what kinds of 
substantive inequality are impermissible will be revisited below.)31 
13 If equality law had its roots in “classes” of persons, what did 
Loh J mean when he concluded that, in Singapore, equality law should 
be “less fixated with the idea of classes, and more focused on the 
fundamental rubric that ‘like should be treated alike’” [emphasis in 
original]?32 The answer lies in the nature of equality itself. 
B. Equality as the rule of law 
14 What follows is an attempt to make sense of the model of the 
concept of equality contained in Art 12 that Loh J implicitly had in 
mind, because, as will be seen, this is rather different from the Court of 
Appeal’s conception of Art 12. 
15 One might, based on the historical account, think that equality 
is best thought of as being a right personal to legal subjects: Art 12 falls 
under the part of the Constitution titled “Fundamental Liberties”, and 
Loh J referred to it as a “right”.33 However, it is not, in the sense that it is 
not a matter purely between the individual and the State – it (to recall 
                                                          
26 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [35]. 
27 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [36]. 
28 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [37]. 
29 One might infer this example from the reference to “taxation”: Lim Meng Suang v 
Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [41]. 
30 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [40], citing Huang-Thio 
Su Mien, “Equal Protection and Rational Classification” [1963] PL 412 at 412. 
31 See paras 44–62 below. 
32 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1059 at [61]. 
33 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1059 at [89]. 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
Published on e-First 16 March 2016
 
326 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2016) 28 SAcLJ 
 
Hohfeld’s analysis)34 lacks the quality of bilaterality. This is because the 
content of the “right” would shift depending on how others were treated: 
if everyone in society were (for example) tortured by the State, nobody 
could complain about inequality; but if only some people (say, members 
of a particular race) were tortured, not only those who were of that race, 
but even those who were not, could be said to be treated unequally from 
the rest. The “right” to equality would thus be, like the “right” of a 
beneficiary under a will, ambulatory and not concrete. 
16 If the “right to equality” is not really a personal right, what is it? 
It is, on its face, an embodiment of the rule of law:35 it simply says that 
laws must be justified. To say that the “right to equality” is something to 
be “balanced” against other concerns36 is not simply a claim that the 
Art 12 “right” is limited in the same way as, say, the Art 14 right to 
freedom of expression is. The Art 14 analysis weighs countervailing 
considerations against the right to freedom of expression, which is a 
right exigible against the State. By contrast, the Art 12 analysis weighs 
countervailing considerations against not a personal right, but rather the 
reasons for a law to exist. This is because all law creates inequality in 
treatment (eg, a law penalising theft creates inequality between thieves 
and non-thieves); it is always possible to say that the inequality is not 
between, say, persons of different citizenship, but rather simply between 
people to whom the law applies and people to whom it does not. This is 
what Peter Westen termed the “empty idea of equality”: “[E]quality is 
entirely ‘circular’. It tells us to treat like people alike; but when we ask 
who ‘like people’ are, we are told they are ‘people who should [according 
to the statute in question] be treated alike’.” Thus, he says, what is 
commonly termed “equality analysis” in fact “logically collapses into 
rights analysis”, eg, a claim against racism is a claim for a right to “racial 
justice” rather than a claim based on equality.37 
C. The High Court’s approach to Art 12(1) review 
17 But if equality is an “empty idea”, as Westen said (and the Court 
of Appeal seems to have agreed),38 is it not arguable that, as the Court of 
Appeal itself argued in a different context (viz that of “proximity” in the 
law of negligence), “[r]ather than denouncing it as a mere ‘label’, the 
                                                          
34 See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions As 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1917) 26(8) Yale LJ 710. 
35 Attorney General of Canada v Lavell [1974] SCR 1349 at 1365–1367. 
36 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1059 at [89]. 
37 Peter Westen, “The Empty Idea of Equality” (1982) 95(3) Harv L Rev 537 at 547, 
560 and 565. 
38 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [61], citing Peter Westen, 
“The Empty Idea of Equality” (1982) 95(3) Harv L Rev 537. 
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courts should strive to infuse some meaning into it”?39 This is, it is 
submitted, what Loh J attempted to do. As has been seen, to say that 
equality is a “right” would lead one to begin analysis with the question 
of whether the “right” has been “infringed”. However, because all law is a 
prima facie “infringement” of equality, the real focus ought to be on the 
concept of justification. This would explain why Loh J said that his 
response to the potential circularity in the traditional two-stage test 
under Art 12, which is essentially the problem that Westen identified, 
was to note that “it is possible to conceive of cases where the object of 
the legislation is illegitimate”, in which case “the court cannot stand by 
the sidelines and do nothing”.40 
18 It is important to appreciate how large a change this was from 
the traditional test. It is true that Loh J cited this older line of case law as 
well, gleaning from it the proposition that:41 
It is now settled law that equality before the law and equal protection 
of the law under Art 12(1) does not mean that all persons are to be 
treated equally, but that all persons in like situations are to be treated 
alike. 
But it is immediately evident how this alone does not live up to the spirit 
behind Art 12(1) itself as Loh J had found it to be. To take the American 
historical context Loh J noted, a law discriminating against black people 
would certainly fall foul of the spirit and purpose of Art 12(1), yet it 
would indeed pass muster under the traditional test: it would treat 
“persons in like situations” (viz all black people) alike, though badly and 
differently from other persons (viz persons of other races). 
19 This uneasy result might explain why Loh J saw the need to add 
analysis of the legitimacy of the purpose of the legislation as a limb of 
the Art 12 test. As has been argued, the crux of Art 12 is the justification 
of law. To Loh J’s mind, however, it was not enough to say that the 
classification was justified relative to the reason for classification, for the 
two might often, by definition, overlap, as they did here:42 
… there is a complete coincidence between the differentia underlying 
the classification prescribed by the legislation and the class defined by 
the object [in the sense of objective or purpose] of that legislation. 
[emphasis added] 
                                                          
39 Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 
4 SLR(R) 100 at [80]. 
40 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [114]. 
41 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [44]. 
42 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [100]. 
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Rather, he said, the reason for classification itself had to be justified.43 
20 Unlike formal equality, which was the concern of older cases 
such as Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor,44 Loh J said that the question 
of legitimacy of purpose was “undoubtedly a substantive concept”. He 
provided, as an example of an illegitimate purpose, the statute in 
Takahashi v Fish and Game Commission45 (“Takahashi”), which prohibited 
“person[s] ineligible to citizenship” from receiving commercial fishing 
licences (and, in fact, used to prohibit “alien Japanese” in those terms 
from doing so).46 However, this usefully illustrates the fact that, as Loh J 
recognised,47 the new approach of assessing the legitimacy of legislative 
purpose is not free from problems. 
D. Issues with the High Court’s approach 
21 First, while one would think that Lim and Chee’s argument was 
that s 377A, like the statute in Takahashi, “discriminated against the 
targeted group … as an end in itself ”.48 However, the vital difference is 
that, while in Takahashi it was the statute itself that constituted the 
discrimination, Lim and Chee only claimed that the discrimination was 
an existing societal phenomenon which s 377A reinforced.49 Again, this 
brings one back to the problem of how to frame an Art 12 claim: 
for example, Loh J appears to have struggled with the fact that the 
classification performed by s 377A was essentially one along the lines of 
sexual orientation,50 yet it did not do so explicitly. 
22 Second, there are conceptual issues with the very idea of 
legislative purpose. For example: For the purposes of inquiring whether 
a law is justified because it has a “legitimate” purpose, should regard be 
had only to the effects specifically intended to be created by the law 
itself (as was Tan’s claim – it was a claim in respect of the criminalising 
effect of s 377A, which was plain on its face), or should other effects also 
be considered, such as the illocutionary effect of the law and its practical 
consequences for homosexuals (as was Lim and Chee’s claim)? These 
issues will be explored in more detail below.51 
                                                          
43 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [114]. 
44 [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710. 
45 334 US 410 (1948). 
46 Takahashi v Fish and Game Commission 334 US 410 at 413–414 and 413, fn 3 
(1948). 
47 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [50]–[51]. 
48 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [115]. 
49 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [7]. 
50 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [48]. 
51 See paras 26–38 below. 
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23 Third, the idea that the purpose has to be legitimate leaves open 
the question as to the standard of justification. In the US, the position is 
that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities … may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry” [emphasis added].52 
This has been interpreted to include “racial classifications” on the 
grounds that they are “especially suspect”.53 Later debates in American 
equality law have thus focused on what other grounds of differentiation 
are also inherently suspect,54 though it is not always clear why they are 
and why the standards of review are what they are. 
24 Given all these issues, one can understand why Loh J took the 
safest course of setting the threshold for legitimacy of purpose as being 
akin to “Wednesbury unreasonableness”,55 which is (or, at least at the 
time, was) high.56 However, this itself contains ambiguity: Would the 
standard be (to adapt the words in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v 
Wednesbury Corp57 (“Wednesbury”) itself) that no reasonable Legislature 
could ever pass a statute with such a purpose,58 or that no reasonable 
Legislature, having regard to Singapore’s Constitution, could ever do so, 
or that no reasonable Legislature, having regard to the views of the people 
of Singapore, could ever do so? This problem is not particular to the 
judicial review of primary legislation; it is inherent in Wednesbury itself. 
25 This may explain why, by way of comparison, several foreign 
jurisdictions have refined the test in various ways: for example, 
(a) the European Court of Human Rights has adopted a conception of 
“necessary in a democratic society” as a test for legitimacy of purpose59 
                                                          
52 United States v Carolene Products Co 304 US 144 at 152, fn 4 (1938). 
53 Loving v Virginia 388 US 1 at 11 (1967). 
54 Thus, for instance, United States v Virginia 518 US 515 at 532–533 (1996) held that 
there the State must show an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for gender-
based classification (although, for reasons which need not detain us here, this 
burden on the State is not as heavy as with race-based classification). 
55 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [116]. 
56 The traditional view is that “the standard of [Wednesbury] unreasonableness, is 
from a jurisprudential perspective, pragmatically fixed at a very high level”: 
Chee Siok Chin v Minister of Home Affairs [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582 at [125]. However, 
the approach in the recent case of Vijaya Kumar s/o Rajendran v Attorney-General 
[2015] SGHC 244 casts doubt on this view, in that it also alluded to considerations 
which one would associate more with proportionality: while Tay Yong Kwang J in 
that case described the threshold as being “relatively high” (at [48]), he also did 
focus on the police’s having “nuanced its approach over time” and taken a 
“calibrated approach”: at [38]. 
57 [1948] 1 KB 223. 
58 See generally Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 
1 KB 223. 
59 See generally Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (213 UNTS 222) (4 November 1950; entry into force 3 September 1953), 
eg, Arts 8, 9, 10 and 11. 
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(with its own jurisprudence on the values of a “democratic society”, 
eg, “pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness”);60 (b) the Supreme Court 
of Canada considers qualities particular to grounds of discrimination 
expressly prohibited by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms61 
or analogous to them62 such as immutability and lack of political 
power;63 (c) the Constitutional Court of South Africa applies tests such 
as whether the “fundamental human dignity of persons as human 
beings” is potentially impaired, or “comparably serious” harm is done;64 
and (d) anti-discrimination legislation in the US has (in the employment 
context) focused not only on the purpose of measures that limit rights, 
but also on the effects.65 Of course, each of these approaches has 
problems of its own: in particular, there is always the problem of the role 
that grounds of discrimination ought to play and whether some should 
be more protected than others.66 One may therefore take issue with 
Loh J’s analysis, but must bear in mind that the various issues he faced 
are by no means easy to tackle. 
IV. The concept of legislative purpose 
26 Before examining the Court of Appeal’s judgment (though at 
the risk of disrupting the flow of thought), it is necessary to examine in 
more detail the very concept of legislative purpose for two reasons. First, 
it is central to Loh J’s analysis. Second, it raises problems which, as will 
be seen, turn out to be similar to the issues raised by the Court of 
Appeal’s approach. 
                                                          
60 Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493 at [83] and [87]. 
61 Constitution Act 1982 (Canada) Pt I. 
62 For completeness, it is submitted that the approach of analogising from the 
grounds of discrimination explicitly prohibited by Art 12(2) of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) to other grounds such as 
gender and sexual orientation should not be adopted in Singapore; if anything 
prohibits discrimination on these un-enumerated grounds, it must be Art 12(1), 
not Art 12(2). This is because, unlike in certain foreign jurisdictions, the list of 
prohibited grounds of discrimination in Art 12(2) was not intended to serve as a 
list of examples, but rather as an exhaustive list targeted at very specific issues 
facing Singapore when Art 12(2) was enacted in its present form in the context 
of immediate post-independence Singapore: see Report of the Constitutional 
Commission (1966) ch 2 (Chairman: Wee Chong Jin). 
63 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 152–153, 
per Wilson J, and 195, per La Forest J. 
64 Harksen v Lane NO 1997 (1) SA 300 at [50(b)(i)]. 
65 Civil Rights Act 42 USC § 2000e-2(k) (1964) (also known as Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act). 
66 See generally Egan v Canada [1995] 2 SCR 513 at 540–572, per L’Heureux-Dubé J 
(dissenting) and Owen M Fiss, “Groups and the Equal Protection Clause” 
(1976) 5(2) Phil & Pub Aff 107. 
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A. The problem of circularity 
27 Loh J recognised that “[d]etermining the purpose or object of a 
piece of legislation is not always a straightforward task”.67 He was not 
referring merely to the evidential difficulty of doing so; he was, rather, 
referring to the conceptual difficulties with the very idea of legislative 
purpose, eg, that of the “proper framing of the object or purpose of the 
impugned legislation”.68 Yet his approach shows that, with respect, these 
difficulties had not been fully overcome, and that, even if the Court of 
Appeal’s decision is authoritative on the purpose of s 377A, the nature of 
the concept of legislative purpose remains a significant open question. 
This is best illustrated by following how the courts determined the 
purpose of s 377A. 
28 Loh J began by noting that the enactment of s 377A in the Penal 
Code in the Straits Settlements in 193869 was done with reference to the 
introduction of a similar provision in England in 1885.70 He characterised 
the purpose of s 377A as being to, based on the understanding that acts 
of “gross indecency” between men whether in private or in public was 
“regrettable”, add to and “strengthen” the existing law in Singapore that 
criminalised them in public by also criminalising them in private, hence 
also bringing Singapore law on this point in line with the law in England 
and other British colonies.71 
29 Note that this is a statement, not of the factual problem targeted 
by the law, but rather what legal outcome (viz criminalisation) the law 
was thought to achieve.72 The distinction between the two is similar to 
that between motive and intention in criminal law:73 
A man who … boards a plane which he knows is bound for 
Manchester, clearly intends to travel to Manchester, even though it is 
the last place he wants to be and his motive for boarding the plane is 
simply to escape pursuit. [emphasis added] 
It is true that the law would criminalise consensual “gross indecency” in 
private, such that such criminalisation must have been the intention of 
                                                          
67 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [50]. 
68 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [58], citing Tan Yock Lin, 
“Equal Protection, Extra-territoriality and Self-incrimination” (1998) 19 Sing L Rev 10. 
69 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [66]–[71]. 
70 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [63]–[65]. 
71 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [67]. 
72 This is a distinction drawn by Bennion in Francis Bennion, Bennion on Statutory 
Interpretation (London: LexisNexis, 5th Ed, 2008) at pp 483–486. 
73 R v Moloney [1985] AC 905 at 926. 
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the Legislature. However, the “motive”74 for introducing this law – 
that is, the “social mischief ” (“a factual situation … which Parliament 
desires to remedy”) or “legal mischief ” (“a condition which constitutes a 
defect in the law”) which motivated the passing of the law75 – was said in 
1938 to be that under English law, viz that in 1885 – “to introduce 
legislation to protect persons above the age of 13 (as the existing law 
already protected those below 13) from assaults” [emphasis added].76 
30 Similarly, before the Court of Appeal, counsel had contended 
that the purpose of s 377A was only to combat male prostitution, such 
that the differentia drawn by s 377A was not rationally connected to this 
purpose, but was instead too broad.77 The Court of Appeal responded 
that the legislative purpose was not only to suppress male prostitution, 
but must also have been to combat what was considered to be “indecent 
behaviour” and “injury … to the morals of the community” in general.78 
This point was based on, inter alia, reports that referred to the need to 
supplement s 377 (which prohibited “carnal intercourse against the 
order of nature”) rather than to supplement another statute which 
prohibited prostitution. The next premise seems to be that there is no 
evidence that society’s idea of what is “indecent” or “immoral” has 
changed since then. 
31 But this leads to the same problem of circularity which Loh J 
identified. The Court of Appeal began with the question “What is the 
purpose and object of Section 377A?”79 It eventually answered it with:80 
[T]he available objective evidence demonstrates that s 377A was 
intended to be of general application, and was not intended to be 
merely confined only (or even mainly) to the specific problem of male 
prostitution. [emphasis in original] 
Again, this is a statement of the intended effect of the legislation, not its 
purpose in the sense of the mischief that motivated the passing of the law; 
it addresses what the legislation criminalised, not why it did. Given this 
approach, the Court of Appeal was constrained to hold that there was a 
“complete coincidence”81 between the differentia and the “purpose”: 
                                                          
74 The author is using the word “motive” for the convenient analogy with the 
criminal law; he does not mean it to refer to Bennion’s definition of motive as the 
“political reasons for the historical decision to legislate in [a particular] way at 
[a particular] time for [a particular] purpose”: Francis Bennion, Bennion on 
Statutory Interpretation (London: LexisNexis, 5th Ed, 2008) at p 484. 
75 R v Moloney [1985] AC 905 at 922–923. 
76 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [65]. 
77 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [131]–[139]. 
78 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [139]. 
79 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [116]. 
80 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [143].  
81 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [153]. 
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the differentia was between men who commit acts of “gross indecency” 
between other men, and the “purpose” was to prohibit the same. 
32 If “purpose” is taken to refer to the intended legal effects of the 
statute – what criminal lawyers would call “intention” – then there is 
great potential for a circular statement of purpose: the law criminalises 
X; the purpose of the law is said to be “to criminalise X”. It is no wonder, 
then, that Loh J saw the potential circularity – “statements in 
Parliamentary debates which will yield an apparent purpose … that 
invariably relates rationally to the differentia” [emphasis added] – and 
hence saw the need to “critically examine and test such legislation” for 
legitimacy of purpose.82 
33 The Court of Appeal said that the way to prevent this circularity 
from rendering Art 12(1) toothless is through an alternative formulation 
of the “intelligible differentia” test.83 The author shall examine to what 
extent this avoids the problem of circularity after discussing the 
theoretical foundations behind the Court of Appeal’s approach. First, 
however, it will be considered whether there can be another way out of 
this circularity. 
B. An alternative approach, and its difficulties 
34 From the above discussion, one might think that the best step 
for the law to take is to rethink the concept of legislative purpose, and 
define it tightly so as to ensure that the purpose of the law is framed such 
that it cannot automatically overlap with the law itself or with the 
differentia drawn by the law. Such a definition might be that, for the 
purposes of Art 12(1) analysis, “purpose” should refer to the mischief 
targeted by the legislation, not the intended legal outcome. This might be 
justified for two reasons. 
35 First, the metaphor with the criminal law is imperfect in one 
important regard: while it might be that a criminal’s intention and 
motive may be the same, eg, when a person intentionally kills not with 
the motive of getting money through insurance fraud, but rather 
intentionally kills simply with the psychopathic motive of killing, the 
law abhors the notion that the Legislature could ever act for a capricious 
purpose – or, rather, in so capricious a manner as to have no purpose. 
36 Second, circularity is not only possible, but a necessary result, 
whenever “purpose” is defined in terms of bringing about a legal result 
rather than a factual one, such as to say (as did the High Court) that the 
                                                          
82 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [114]. 
83 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [114]. 
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purpose is to criminalise X or (as did the Court of Appeal) to be of 
general application to situations of X. This is circular simply because 
legislation is constitutive of legal results. One can coherently say that the 
purpose of criminalising X is to “reduce the incidence of X”, or to 
“discourage X”, for then the courts would be able to test arguments 
such as that such purposes are not necessarily best achieved by 
criminalisation; but to say that the purpose of criminalising X is to 
criminalise X is to say very little at all. 
37 That having been said, it must be acknowledged that this 
solution is far from perfect: it still leaves the problem that there are 
different possible levels of generality at which to frame the purpose of 
legislation. Bennion himself (who equates “purpose or object” with 
“mischief ”)84 admits that “the concept of legislative purpose is not 
straightforward”: he notes that there are various “purposes”, from the 
purpose of law itself, to the purpose of different areas of law, to the 
purpose of an Act, to the purpose of a particular provision.85 The 
problem is made even more difficult when (as with s 377A) the 
legislation in question is an addition to or modification of existing 
legislation. 
38 An example of these difficulties is seen in Public Prosecutor v 
Taw Cheng Kong,86 as summarised by Loh J: the Court of Appeal in that 
case held that the purpose of the additions to the Prevention of 
Corruption Act87 was the “more effective control and suppression of 
corruption”88 (that is, it focused on the purpose of the Prevention of 
Corruption Act), whereas the High Court’s framing of the purpose 
specified exactly what was insufficiently “effective” about the previous 
legislation: the purpose was to “address acts of corruption taking place 
outside Singapore but affecting events within Singapore”89 (that is, it 
focused on the purpose of the new provisions in the Act). And one can 
imagine a reviewing court demanding an even more specific statement 
of legislative purpose that, for example, proves that such acts are so 
significant that whether or not they are addressed makes a difference to 
whether the overall anti-corruption regime is “effective” or not. Unless 
some clearer definition of “purpose”, including principles on how 
generally it is to be defined, can be drawn up, this problem will prove to 
                                                          
84 Francis Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (London: LexisNexis, 5th Ed, 
2008) at p 483 read with pp 916 and 922–923. 
85 Francis Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (London: LexisNexis, 5th Ed, 
2008) at p 947. 
86 [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489. 
87 Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed. 
88 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [57(a)]. 
89 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [55(c)]. 
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be most intractable. Therefore, with this problem in mind, the Court of 
Appeal’s view will now be examined. 
V. The Court of Appeal’s analysis: An expanded notion of an 
“intelligible differentia” 
A. The rejection of the test of legitimacy of purpose 
39 For the Court of Appeal, the test of illegitimacy of legislative 
purpose was a non-starter because for a court to apply it would be to 
“usurp the legislative function” and act like a “mini-legislature”.90 With 
respect, however, the link between the two is not as clear as it may seem. 
After all, one may ask, is not any judicial review of legislation for 
constitutionality an interference with the legislative function? It may be 
true in one sense that, as the Court of Appeal recognised, the courts 
cannot “amend or modify a statute”: this is true in so far as they cannot 
do so “based on [their] own personal preference or fiat” [emphasis in 
original omitted].91 However, it does not follow that “only the Legislature 
has the power to review its own legislation and amend legislation 
accordingly” [emphasis added].92 Not only the test under Art 12(1) 
endorsed by the Court of Appeal, but any test for compatibility with any 
of the Pt IV fundamental liberties, will potentially lead to “amend[ment] 
or modif[ication] of a statute” in the sense of rendering infringing 
legislation “void” “to the extent of the inconsistency”93 – and it may be 
that this, even applying the Court of Appeal’s test, entails striking out a 
statute in toto rather than doing anything which may be described as 
mere “interpret[ation]”94 – because Art 4 of the Constitution says so; and 
Loh J was not claiming any power of “amend[ment] or modif[ication]” 
beyond this. 
40 In other words, with respect, the phrase “mini-legislature” must 
be read with caution. If Loh J’s test can be said to entail the court acting 
as a “mini-legislature”, then so must be any exercise of a power of 
judicial review of legislation, including even the Court of Appeal’s 
Art 12(1) test. Indeed, by this reasoning, one may as well describe a 
court performing the judicial review of executive action as being a 
“mini-executive”. In truth, judicial review of executive action, even to 
the extent of holding that executive power is exercised for an improper 
purpose, is not an exercise of executive power at all, even to a limited 
extent; it is, rather, an exercise of the judicial power to police the 
                                                          
90 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [82]–[83] and [154]. 
91 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [81]. 
92 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [82]. 
93 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 4. 
94 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [81] and [83]. 
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boundaries of executive conduct. Similarly, the judicial review of 
legislation is an exercise of the judicial power to police the boundaries of 
legislative conduct. In both cases, it is for the courts to discover what 
these boundaries are, but the question of whether it is legitimate to 
police them does not turn on what they are. 
41 This leads to the way to break out of what would otherwise be a 
question-begging problem: that it is rightly said that the courts cannot 
exercise legislative power or act as “mini-legislatures”; but it is not 
explained why, on the Court of Appeal’s account, one technique for 
“scrutinising legislation”95 is an unacceptable usurpation of legislative 
power while another is not. The answer is that this takes the wrong 
starting point. One should note that the Constitution defines the courts’ 
role in absolute and positive, not relative and negative, terms. It does not 
make a statement similar to one that the courts are by definition a 
“counter-legislature and not a Legislature”, or that “the courts cannot 
encroach upon the legislative power”, or that “the courts’ power is to do 
anything other than exercise legislative power”. Rather, the Constitution 
simply says that the courts have exclusive “judicial power”.96 Defining 
“judicial power” is difficult, but the point is that the best approach in 
determining what the courts can do is not to ask what the courts are not, 
and not to ask what legislative power is, but rather to ask only what 
judicial power is. 
42 For these reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the bare 
concept of the separation of powers – that “the courts are separate and 
distinct from the Legislature” [emphasis in original]97 – does not by itself 
completely justify the Court of Appeal’s rejection of Loh J’s test; only a 
definition of the powers, not merely a recognition of the fact that they 
are separated, can. This, in turn, engages the issue highlighted above98 of 
identifying the difference between the legal and the extra-legal, which is, 
in short, that this difference is itself constructed by the law through the 
courts. It is, for the reasons in the paragraphs above, unclear whether, 
when the Court of Appeal said that “there are no legal standards which 
can guide the court in ascertaining whether the object of that statute is 
illegitimate” [emphasis in original],99 it means that there can never be 
standards that are legal in nature, or that, according to the law as it is, 
there happen to be no legal standards (in which case the courts are free 
to devise some). This underscores the author’s argument that the proper 
role of the courts is by no means self-evident. 
                                                          
95 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [82]. 
96 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 93. 
97 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [77]. 
98 See paras 5–11 above. 
99 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [85]. 
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43 Nonetheless, all this is somewhat academic, for, as will be seen, 
the Court of Appeal’s test may not be very different from Loh J’s test in 
practice. 
B. Equality as an aspiration 
44 If the test of illegitimacy of purpose was, in Loh J’s view, so 
necessary to the concept of equality, how could the Court of Appeal do 
away with it and yet not leave Art 12 totally useless? It is submitted that 
the answer must begin with a recognition that the Court of Appeal was 
dealing with equality in a completely different sense from the idea 
proffered above of equality as a demand for justification of laws. Like the 
latter, the former is also an idea of inequality as something that is 
inevitable. However, unlike the understanding of the High Court’s 
reasoning presented above, the Court of Appeal saw inequality not as 
something created by the law, but rather something that naturally exists 
in fact. It is true that Loh J alluded to this too, speaking of the “inherent 
inequality and differences pervading society”; but he appears to have 
conflated it with, and ultimately subsumed it under, the proposition that 
“it is inevitable that [the legal act of] classification will produce 
inequality”.100 By contrast, the Court of Appeal’s focus was the “(factual) 
reality that inequality (in all its various forms) is an inevitable part of 
daily life” [emphasis in original omitted; other emphasis added], such 
that it saw its task of one as creating, as far as it could, a “basic level of 
equality”.101 
45 Hence, for the Court of Appeal, Art 12 was not an embodiment 
of the rule of law; rather, it was an allusion to the desirability of “various 
forms” of equality. It is not clear what these “various forms” are, but the 
reference to “daily life” is suggestive – at the risk of speculation, one may 
suppose that this includes “forms” such as income equality and equality 
of educational opportunity. This suggests that the Court of Appeal’s 
approach to Art 12, and, perhaps, Pt IV of the Constitution more 
generally, was very different from Loh J’s. 
46 Loh J appears to have begun with the assumption that Art 12 is 
purely a legal concept. Thus, he justified his formulating and applying 
the test of the legal legitimacy of legislative purpose on the grounds that, 
otherwise, the law, through “the court”, would but be able to “stand by 
the sidelines and do nothing”.102 By contrast, the Court of Appeal spoke 
of asking what “the law” can do “to ensure that there is a basic level of 
                                                          
100 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [44]. 
101 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [61]. 
102 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [114]. 
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equality” [emphasis in original],103 and said that the legal test as 
formulated “furnish[es] the courts with particular legal principles that 
give effect (albeit not fully) to the concept of equality embodied in 
Art 12(1)” [emphasis in original; other emphasis added],104 suggesting 
that there is more to the Art 12 conception of equality, but that this 
“more” is not the business of the courts, and is not even a limitation on 
the exercise of the legislative power. In other words, Art 12(1) is 
“declaratory and aspirational”105 – it is submitted that this may be 
unpacked as meaning that the legal part is “declaratory” while the 
non-legal part is “aspirational”. If one thinks this renders Art 12(1) weak, 
it must be remembered that, in so holding, the Court of Appeal, like the 
High Court, ultimately did recognise that Art 12(1) refers to substantive 
rather than formal equality, hence paving the way for the expansion of 
the test which will be explored below.106 
47 As an aside, one may criticise the Court of Appeal’s saying that 
part of Art 12(1) is “aspirational in nature”.107 As Tribe argues, an 
aspiration can be broad and open-ended but still a legal norm;108 thus, 
the fact that Art 12(1) does not itself contain “specific legal criteria”109 
may just as plausibly be taken as an invitation to the courts to create 
some (just as, one may argue, the Privy Council did, and the Singapore 
courts later followed, in introducing into the jurisprudence on Art 9 
the idea of “fundamental principles of natural justice”, a phrase which 
appears nowhere in the Constitution).110 
48 Alternatively, if by “aspirational” the court meant “non-legal”, 
then there arises a problem which Scalia identified: How does one tell 
which parts of the Constitution are to be taken to create legal norms and 
which are not, since “[i]t would be most peculiar for aspirational 
provisions to be interspersed randomly among the very concrete and 
hence obviously nonaspirational prescriptions” in the Constitution?111 
One might as well say that, for example, Art 9(1) is “aspirational in 
                                                          
103 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [61]. 
104 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [88]. 
105 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [90]. 
106 See paras 50–62 below. 
107 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [88]. 
108 Laurence H Tribe, “Comment” in A Matter of Interpretation (Antonin Scalia & 
Amy Gutmann eds) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) at p 88 ff. This 
position appears similar to Dworkin’s account of legal principles (as opposed to 
legal rules) in Ronald M Dworkin, “The Model of Rules” (1972) 81(5) Yale LJ 912. 
109 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [90]. 
110 The origin of this is Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710. 
See generally Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 SLR 1129 at [61]–[67] for 
a summary of the present position. 
111 Scalia in A Matter of Interpretation (Antonin Scalia & Amy Gutmann eds) 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) at p 135. 
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nature” because it contains much less legal detail than Arts 9(2) to 9(4) – 
a position which runs contrary to long-established case law in 
Singapore. 
49 Nonetheless, the idea of Art 12(1) being partly “aspirational” 
still merits consideration because, as will be seen, it changes the nature 
of the legal test to be applied. To recapitulate: while Loh J thought that 
Art 12 (and, perhaps, all of the Pt IV fundamental liberties) was purely 
legal in nature, the Court of Appeal thought that it was only partly legal 
in nature, and that the court should confine itself to the legal part lest it 
usurp non-legal (that is, political) bodies’ role in handling the non-legal 
part. Of course, this does not mean that Loh J was advocating 
juristocracy at the expense of the Legislature’s role – indeed, one dares 
say that, if he had been, then the plaintiffs’ claims would have succeeded 
before him without much fanfare at all. Rather, what happened was that, 
because of their different conceptions of the nature of Art 12 itself, Loh J 
and the Court of Appeal also had different ideas of the conceptual nature 
of the limitations to a potential Art 12 legal claim. 
C. The Court of Appeal’s approach to Art 12(1) review and 
potential issues 
50 Yet, like Loh J, the Court of Appeal also reserved the right to 
strike down patently unjustifiable legislation. Loh J did so by adding a 
test of the legitimacy of legislative purpose, on the understanding that 
the “intelligible differentia” and “rational relation” test were both limited 
because of how they operated in tandem. By contrast, the Court of 
Appeal did so by, while holding that the “rational relation” test was by 
itself limited because it “does not really address the concept of equality as 
such” [emphasis in original],112 expanding the definition of “intelligible 
differentia” from an understandable distinction into a justifiable (that is, 
not “so unreasonable as to be illogical and/or incoherent” [emphasis in 
original omitted])113 distinction. 
51 The conceptual difference here is subtle, but crucial. Both Loh J 
and the Court of Appeal applied a high threshold of unreasonableness, 
but they applied it to different things. Loh J applied it to the purpose of 
classification, while the Court of Appeal applied it to the very act of 
classification. Thus, Loh J asked whether criminalising homosexual 
intercourse to express disapproval of it was Wednesbury unreasonable, 
while the Court of Appeal, it would appear at first glance (but see 
below), asked whether singling out homosexuals (for whatever purpose) 
was Wednesbury unreasonable. 
                                                          
112 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [69]. 
113 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [67]. 
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52 The fact that the Court of Appeal’s approach is an expansion of 
what was, before this case, the prevailing understanding of the 
“intelligible differentia” test, and that it is arguably, just like Loh J’s test, 
also partly motivated by the novel nature of the claims (as outlined 
above),114 is evident from a comparison with the “intelligible differentia” 
test as articulated by the High Court in Taw Cheng Kong v Public 
Prosecutor115 (which was not overturned on appeal on this point), 
viz “a consistent means of identifying the persons discriminated 
against”, or, to put it another way, a “common identifying feature”.116 
Unlike the Court of Appeal’s definition in the instant case, this older 
definition of “intelligible differentia” only asks whether it is clear which 
side of a line a person falls on, but does not ask whether the line is a 
good one to have. 
53 What does one make of this new development? One possible 
view is that the Court of Appeal’s analysis comes much closer to the 
doctrine of “suspect classifications” in the US.117 It was previously noted 
that the US courts will be more willing to hold a differentia based on 
race, for example, as being unacceptably unreasonable, however clearly 
comprehensible it may be. Similarly, the Court of Appeal arguably had 
some kinds of inherently suspect differentiae in mind. Therefore, while 
the Court of Appeal may appear to have disapproved of Loh J’s test of 
rationality of purpose for being too far-reaching, the Court of Appeal’s 
test is potentially equally or even more far-reaching. A statute based on a 
Wednesbury unreasonable differentia but with a rational, even noble, 
purpose (perhaps, to modify the example in Wednesbury itself, firing all 
red-haired teachers on the grounds that, statistically speaking, the vast 
majority of red-haired teachers happen to be bad at teaching) would 
have been allowed by Loh J, but perhaps not by the Court of Appeal. On 
this view, the question, then, is: What are these unacceptable differentiae 
of which the Court of Appeal speaks? 
54 An explicit answer is not given. The Court of Appeal said that 
what would be an unacceptable differentia in its eyes would be one 
that is “illogical and/or incoherent”, such that “there can be no 
reasonable dispute (let alone controversy) as to that [illogicality and/or 
incoherence] from a moral, political and/or ethical point of view (or, for 
that matter, any other point of view”.118 This is not entirely clear, given 
that illogicality and incoherence are, on some definitions, the same as 
incomprehensibility (which was Loh J’s test). Therefore, if the Court of 
Appeal had modified Loh J’s understanding of the “intelligible 
                                                          
114 See paras 5–11 above. 
115 [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78. 
116 Taw Cheng Kong v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78 at [33(b)]. 
117 See paras 21–25 above. 
118 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [67]. 
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differentia” test (as it said it did), then it must have used “illogical and/or 
incoherent” to refer to substantive undesirability rather than merely 
creating a procedure of classification that is undesirable because it is too 
incomprehensible to apply in practice. 
55 Yet this does not help surmount the problem of circularity 
identified above, which is that the differentia and the purpose of the law 
might be defined in exactly the same terms, such that, by definition, 
there must be a rational relation (indeed, often a perfect overlap) 
between the two. Loh J aimed to surmount this circularity by testing the 
legitimacy of the purpose. The Court of Appeal aimed to surmount it by 
testing the legitimacy of the differentia. As has been seen, the former is 
not a perfect solution. It will now be argued that the latter test is 
actually, in effect, similar to the former. This will be done by considering 
counsel’s hypothetical example of a law which “bans all women from 
driving on the roads”. 
56 The court said that the differentia in this example may well be 
“illogical and/or incoherent”119 (in the sense defined in the previous 
paragraphs).120 But the court did not say exactly what this differentia is. 
It did offer something of a definition of “differentia”: it suggested that 
the word “differentia” refers not to the purpose of the statute, for the 
Court of Appeal mentioned it as a separate stage; it refers to the 
classification system – a “distinguishing mark or character”.121 
57 Now, one might think that the key problem with this law is its 
discrimination against women. Hence, one might say that the differentia 
is between men and women. However, this would mean that what would 
be “illogical and/or incoherent” in the Court of Appeal’s sense would, by 
the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, be not the banning of women from 
driving (which is the law and/or the purpose of the law), but simply the 
application of different laws to men and women (which is the differentia 
itself). This would be a most striking proposition: it would mean that 
much of the Women’s Charter,122 to take just one example, would be 
unconstitutional. And because the “intelligible differentia” test is a 
“threshold test”,123 there would not even be a legally valid counter-
argument that different treatment of men and women is sometimes 
justified. 
58 On this view, this example shows the difficulties with not only 
the Court of Appeal’s test. Indeed, the fact that the court remarked that 
                                                          
119 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [114]. 
120 See paras 50–52 above.  
121 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [67]. 
122 Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed. 
123 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [61]–[62]. 
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this would be an “extreme provision which would probably not be 
enacted by a reasonable Parliament in the Singapore context” [emphasis 
added]124 suggests that the real problem with such a law might not be 
with the “intelligible differentia” test, but rather simply with its content – 
and that such an “extreme” case would warrant a similarly striking 
change in the court’s approach, eg, toward Loh J’s approach of questioning 
the legitimacy of the purpose of the statute (which would probably save 
the Women’s Charter from being struck down). 
59 However, reading the Court of Appeal’s judgment in such a 
manner and holding the differentia drawn by the hypothetical law to be 
between men and women is difficult to reconcile with the Court of 
Appeal’s affirmation that Art 12(2), which identifies only “religion, race, 
descent [and] place of birth” as prohibited grounds of discrimination, 
exhausts the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination.125 The Court 
of Appeal observed that the American courts are free to take the lead in 
identifying different grounds on which unequal treatment may be based 
and applying different tests or different presumptions to different 
grounds, because the corresponding provision is worded in an open-
ended manner. But it then held that this does not apply to Singapore 
because, although Art 12(1) is worded in a similarly open-ended 
manner, Art 12(2) mentions specific grounds of discrimination, with the 
implication that no others are constitutionally protected. Indeed, the 
court then went on to remark that its Art 12(1) test, though attenuated 
compared to Loh J’s test, is strengthened by the substantive checks in 
Art 12(2).126 
60 (As an aside, perhaps one could retort that this is incorrect – 
that Art 12(2) does not confine Art 12(1) because they discuss 
two different things: Art 12(1) is about “equality” and inequality, while 
Art 12(2) uses the word “discrimination”. On at least some accounts, 
there are conceptual differences between the two.127 Nonetheless, no 
such arguments appear to have been considered by the Court of 
Appeal.) 
61 Therefore, it is more likely that, in the example of the legislation 
banning women from driving on roads, the differentia the Court of 
Appeal identified (and took issue with) was not women versus men, but 
rather women who could drive versus men who could drive, or perhaps 
women who could drive versus all other persons. In short, therefore, the 
difficult problem of determining how to frame the differentia for the 
                                                          
124 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [114]. 
125 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [90]–[92]. 
126 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [113]. 
127 See, as just one example, Elisa Holmes, “Anti Discrimination Rights without 
Equality” (2005) 68(2) MLR 175. 
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purposes of the Court of Appeal’s test is almost the same as the problem 
identified above of determining how to frame the legislative purpose for 
the purposes of Loh J’s test. If this is correct, then the power which the 
Court of Appeal reserved for itself to strike down legislation must be 
exactly the same as that which Loh J would have reserved, just phrased 
in different terms. 
62 The upshot is that it might well be that the Court of Appeal, 
though starting from different theoretical foundations compared to 
Loh J, ultimately ended up with a test that is, in substance, the same. 
And if this is so, the potential problems of circularity remain the same. 
VI. Other miscellaneous issues arising from the judgments 
A. How legislative purpose is formed 
63 A piece of evidence of legislative purpose which Loh J (but not 
the Court of Appeal) examined in detail was a set of speeches made in 
Parliament during debates on s 377A in 2007. It is unclear what effect 
these speeches had on the issue of legislative purpose. Was the correct 
approach for the court to look at the purpose as it was in 2007, such that 
it held that Parliament had affirmed in 2007 the purpose of s 377A as it 
was in 1938? Or is it that the 2007 debates were not relevant at all, and 
the court was supposed to look at the purpose as it was in 1938? Loh J 
equivocated between the two, saying that he “d[id] not think there [was] 
a need to” look at the 2007 debates (suggesting that they could not even 
have changed the purpose), but also that “the purpose of s 377A, as 
articulated … in 1938, was reaffirmed by Parliament in 2007” 
(suggesting that Parliament could have changed the purpose in 2007, but 
had consciously decided not to).128 This raises some subtle but interesting 
constitutional issues; there is insufficient space to do more than outline 
them here. 
64 If Parliament could in principle have changed the purpose of 
existing legislation in 2007, pursuant to what power would it have done 
so? Article 58 of the Constitution says that “the power of the Legislature 
to make laws shall be exercised by Bills passed by Parliament and 
assented to by the President”; but, as Loh J acknowledged, no bill was 
introduced regarding s 377A and nothing was even voted on.129 The bill 
discussed and voted on only discussed s 377 – a different statute. This 
raises two problems. 
                                                          
128 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [78]. 
129 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [75]. 
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65 The first problem is about the distinction between making of 
legislation and formation of legislative purpose. There are three 
possibilities: (a) Parliament could not have changed or added to the 
purpose of s 377A in 2007, for otherwise it would have been violating 
Art 58; (b) it could have because changing the purpose of existing 
legislation is not an act of “mak[ing] laws” within the meaning of Art 58; 
or (c) it could have because the act of law-making that consisted of 
introducing legislation to repeal s 377 could have changed or added to 
the purpose of s 377A. 
66 Some light may be shed on this issue by Loh J’s interesting 
distinction between “practical reason[s]” to retain s 377A on the one 
hand, and the “purpose” of s 377A on the other.130 With respect, the 
conceptual distinction between the two is not quite clear: as Dworkin 
put it, “a statute owes its existence not only to the decision people made 
to enact it but also to the decision of other people later not to amend or 
repeal it”.131 Rather, the difference Loh J had in mind, it is submitted, can 
be distilled from the words “put forward as the purpose” [emphasis in 
original omitted; other emphasis added].132 It was not a conceptual 
distinction, but rather one between legislators’ implicit reasoning and 
their stated reasons. Loh J meant that what matters is the stated purpose, 
not what the Legislature actually had in mind. 
67 This approach may be contrasted with that in the 
contemporaneous Court of Appeal case of Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v 
Attorney-General133 (“Vellama”), where the court, based on analysis of 
what Members of Parliament “could have” said134 and whether or not 
they shared a common understanding of words and phrases in the 
Constitution, sought to ascertain not what purpose the Legislature 
stated, but what it actually had in mind.135 
68 Moreover, in Vellama, the court focused not on the views of the 
single legislator who had introduced the Bill, but rather on that of the 
Legislature as a whole.136 This leads us to the second issue: How is 
purpose “put forward”, and through what evidence may it be proven to 
have been “put forward”? 
                                                          
130 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [84]. 
131 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana Press, 1986) at p 318. 
132 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [84]. 
133 [2013] 4 SLR 1. 
134 Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1 at [68]. 
135 Benjamin Joshua Ong, “Developments in the Law on Constitutional and Statutory 
Interpretation” Singapore Law Watch Commentary (September 2013) at pp 4–5. 
136 Benjamin Joshua Ong, “Developments in the Law on Constitutional and Statutory 
Interpretation” Singapore Law Watch Commentary (September 2013) at p 5. 
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69 All this raises the fundamental conceptual problem of the 
distinction between the purpose of law (and, for that matter, the 
intention of the Legislature) on one hand, and law itself on the other. 
Is purpose (and intention) something tied to a single piece of legislation, 
such that one cannot contemplate its very existence apart from the 
legislation to which it attaches? Or is it that purpose (and intention) is 
something that the Legislature has in the background, and the 
Legislature can choose to express it and give it effect (or partly, or not at 
all) by choosing to legislate (or less far-reachingly, or not at all)? 
70 This aside, there is also an evidential problem. Unlike with 
Parliament’s policy of adopting a single statement of purpose by a 
Minister who introduces a Bill as its collective will, particularly after the 
passing of s 9A of the Interpretation Act,137 it is less clear that the debates 
on legislation in the abstract are to be held to evidence legislative intent. 
On the other hand, it is also arguable that Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v 
Attorney-General138 (“Jeyaretnam”) is authority for the act of “locating 
legislative intent in the ongoing practice or attitude of the Legislature … 
rather than in the intention at the time when the legislation was made”, 
the assumption being that “Parliament was seen as playing an active role 
in the development and operation of the law rather than just the making 
of the law”.139 
71 Ultimately, the approach taken by the High Court blurs the 
distinction between acts of Parliament and acts (in the sense of actions) 
of Parliament. It is interesting to see how this trend will play out: it is 
by no means constitutionally wrong, but it certainly is different from 
the English position. Again, this highlights the fact that, while the 
Constitution says that the Legislature has exclusive “legislative power”,140 
the definition of “legislative power” is not set in stone, and certainly not 
necessarily the same as in other jurisdictions. 
                                                          
137 Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed. It is somewhat suggestive that, during debates in Parliament, 
the Minister introducing what became s 9A of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 
2002 Rev Ed) said, and no Member of Parliament (“MP”) objected, in response to a 
comment by one MP’s remark about the nature of legislative intention (Singapore 
Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (26 February 1993) vol 60 at col 519): 
Where I disagree with him is when he says that the intention of the Bill [ie, of 
Bills in general] is not decided by the Ministers or Cabinet but by the officials 
[ie, civil servants and draftsmen] … I can tell him that in this Government, in 
this Cabinet, the decisions and the intentions are made by Cabinet and the 
Ministers which compose the Cabinet. [emphasis added] 
138 [2014] 1 SLR 345. 
139 Benjamin Joshua Ong, “Public Law Theory and Judicial Review in Singapore” 
Singapore Law Watch Commentary (December 2013) at p 3. 
140 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 38. 
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B. Evidence in judicial review proceedings 
72 In Tan’s case, the additional argument was made that s 377A was 
“absurd” because homosexuality is immutable.141 Putting aside the 
factual question of whether sexual orientation is really “inborn and 
unable to be changed” [emphasis in original omitted],142 a few observations 
may be made from the fact that Loh J even allowed these arguments to 
be heard. 
73 Loh J chose to admit – in fact, order the tendering of – 
scientific evidence on this issue because the matter was “grav[e]” and 
“contentious”.143 In other words, Loh J was prepared to perform judicial 
review of s 377A not only based on the considerations that had gone 
into its enactment (viz whether Parliament had considered the 
mutability issue), but also regarding whether those considerations had 
been considered correctly if he had found that the evidence, objectively 
speaking, had been clear either way. This approach would have been 
potentially game-changing. Would this approach also have allowed or 
even demanded, say, evidence of budgets to be considered in judicial 
review of the non-provision of a healthcare service by the State,144 or 
data about school curricular and the relative performance of students of 
different races in judicial review of the State’s education system?145 For 
that matter, would s 108 of the Evidence Act146 place the burden of 
production of such data on the State147 on the ground that it would be 
“especially within the knowledge of ” the State rather than the individual 
applicant? Such practices are not wrong, but are certainly not often (if at 
all) presently heard of in Singapore. 
74 By contrast, it is less clear that the Court of Appeal would have 
heard such evidence. There is an element of ambiguity in its approach: 
the Court of Appeal said (a) there was “no definitive evidence” 
[emphasis in original omitted]148 one way or another; but also that 
(b) “[i]n any event” the court would “not [be] in a position to arrive at a 
conclusive determination” [emphasis in original]149 because the issue 
would be a “scientific and extra-legal argument” [emphasis in original 
omitted].150 
                                                          
141 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1059 at [22(d)]. 
142 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1059 at [45]. 
143 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1059 at [42]. 
144 Eldridge v Attorney General of British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 624 at [87]. 
145 DH v Czech Republic (2008) 47 EHRR 3. 
146 Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed. 
147 DH v Czech Republic (2008) 47 EHRR 3. 
148 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [176]. 
149 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [176]. 
150 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [176]. 
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75 Assuming that the latter is what the Court of Appeal meant, the 
distinction is as follows: Loh J’s concern was that the plaintiffs’ scientific 
evidence was insufficient, whereas the Court of Appeal suggested that it 
was, and must have been, irrelevant. With respect, Loh J’s approach 
should be preferred. The Evidence Act specifically allows the admission 
of expert evidence on scientific matters;151 if such evidence is relevant to 
the case, why should there be a blanket ban on it in constitutional 
review cases? Again, this revisits the problem of distinguishing between 
the “legal” and the “extra-legal”. It is true that science is not law, but it 
may well be that the law directs the courts to consider science. It might 
be that the Legislature, with the support of the Executive and the civil 
service, may generally be in a very good position to assess scientific 
evidence, but it does not follow that (a) it has done such an assessment 
at all; or (b) the courts must therefore have no role to play at all. The 
Court of Appeal should thus have stopped at saying that there was 
insufficient and insufficiently weighty evidence before it to prove the 
plaintiffs’ case; it should not have ruled out all “scientific” matters by 
default. 
76 These issues aside, counsel could have, by pleading the case 
differently, avoided the problems of scientific evidence altogether. 
Counsel had tendered foreign court decisions as authority for the fact 
that sexual orientation is immutable. Loh J rightly rejected this 
approach: “such opinions are not substitutes for evidence of a fact” 
[emphasis in original],152 particularly since foreign decisions might 
assume that sexual orientation is immutable rather than make a finding 
of fact to that effect. Instead, what counsel should have done was to cite 
these very same cases as authority for another point, viz that, even if 
sexual orientation is factually changeable, people should not be expected 
to change it153 because it is “changeable only at unacceptable personal 
costs”,154 or a fundamental part of one’s very “experience of being 
human”.155 Given that, as has been seen, Loh J was willing to see past a 
criminalisation of particular behaviour to the underlying impact on 
people with a particular identity, it would have been better to take the 
opportunity to push this argument further to consider why the analysis 
ought to pay particular attention to that particular sort of identity. This 
line of argument may well have helped the plaintiffs overcome the Court 
                                                          
151 Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) s 47. 
152 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1059 at [49]. 
153 See generally Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2nd Ed, 2011) at pp 131–139, especially 131–134, for this argument as well as 
possible variants. 
154 Egan v Canada [1995] 2 SCR 513 at 528, cited in Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General 
[2013] 4 SLR 1059 at [51]. 
155 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1998 (1) SA 6 
at [101], cited in Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1059 at [53]. 
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of Appeal’s view that “scientific” arguments are “extra-legal” and 
therefore “outside the purview of the court” [emphasis in original 
omitted]156 by avoiding the scientific issue and focusing on a normative 
one instead. 
C. The future of the law regarding Art 12(2) 
77 Even as this note has focused on the courts’ pronouncements on 
Art 12(1), another aspect of the instant cases must not be neglected: the 
Court of Appeal has strongly reaffirmed the role of Art 12(2) in 
prohibiting discrimination on certain grounds in certain circumstances. 
This is perhaps best analysed in more detail elsewhere; here, it will 
suffice respectfully to point out that Art 12(2) contains issues which are 
not as much more “concrete” and “specific”157 than Art 12(1) than the 
Court of Appeal made it out to be. Examples include: Must intent to 
“discriminat[e]” be proven, or is it also “discrimination” to have 
ostensibly neutral treatment but which has a disparate impact on people 
of different groups?158 Are private actors bound by the prohibition of 
discrimination in the “carrying on of any trade [etc]”, and, if so, does 
that mean that other Pt IV fundamental liberties also have a horizontal 
direct effect as between private parties?159 The words “on the ground 
only of ” suggest a causation test; what exactly is the nature of this test? 
Consider the interesting example of whether a blind person who uses a 
seeing-eye dog who is excluded from a restaurant which disallows dogs 
should properly be said to have been excluded because he is blind or 
because he has a dog.160 Moreover, causation is complicated by the fact 
that discriminators may seek to give excuses to obscure the true nature 
of the reason for their disparate treatment of certain groups. 
                                                          
156 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [176]. 
157 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [89]–[91]. 
158 Eg, Civil Rights Act 42 USC § 2000e-2(k) (1964); see also Egan v Canada [1995] 
2 SCR 513 at 553: 
If a projectile were thrown against a soft surface, then it would leave a larger 
scar than if it were thrown against a resilient surface. In fact, the depth of the 
scar inflicted will generally be a function of both the nature of the affected 
surface and the nature of the projectile used. In my view, assessing 
discriminatory impact is, in principle, no different. 
159 There appears to be no authority on this point in Singapore, although the 
Malaysian courts have said that the Constitution of Malaysia 1957 only 
concerns relations between the individual and the State: see Thio Li-ann, “Soft 
Constitutional Law in Nonliberal Asian Constitutional Democracies” (2010) 
8(4) Int’l J Con L 766 at 780, referring to Beatrice a/p AT Fernandez v Sistem 
Penerbangan Malaysia [2005] 3 MLJ 681 at [13]. 
160 London Borough of Lewisham v Malcolm [2008] 1 AC 1399 at [35], per Lord Scott, 
now reversed in effect by s 15(1)(a) of the UK Equality Act 2010 (c 15). 
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D. The grounds for judicial review of legislation 
78 Loh J’s novel analysis of the issue of legitimacy of legislative 
purpose, and (as has been argued) the Court of Appeal’s implicitly 
having reached a similar result which is similar in effect, raises a very 
interesting side issue which warrants much further consideration that is 
possible here; what follows is merely an outline. If, as Loh J said, 
a statute can be struck down in an Art 12(1) claim for having an 
illegitimate purpose, or the Court of Appeal’s hypothetical law banning 
women from driving may be struck down, then why must Art 12(1) 
come into the picture at all, when the real claim being made is 
illegitimacy of purpose rather than inequality? One can imagine, 
for example, a statute mandating that everyone be tortured for a 
monarch’s sadistic pleasure: this would not be unequal, but would still 
probably be an illegitimate purpose. So might be a statute banning 
everyone from driving. 
79 The proposition that judicial review of legislation can be 
performed without reference to the grounds set out in the Constitution 
(such as conflict with the fundamental liberties set out in Pt IV of the 
Constitution, or usurpation of judicial power)161 is unprecedented in 
Singapore. One might think that it is an absurd non-starter. It certainly 
is in the UK, by virtue of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty; 
there, the courts’ powers under the Human Rights Act 1998162 to 
interpret legislation in a manner compliant with the European 
Convention of Human Rights163 or declare it incompatible164 with the 
Convention are limited, and seen as an exception to parliamentary 
sovereignty. However, in Singapore, it is the Constitution, not Parliament, 
which is supreme; at most, it is said that Parliament is the supreme 
legislator while the courts are the supreme judicial authority – neither is 
said to be supreme or sovereign over the other. 
80 One must therefore not take the Court of Appeal’s statement 
that “Singapore has adopted the model of parliamentary sovereignty”165 
as denying this. With respect, this use of the phrase “parliamentary 
sovereignty” is somewhat imprecise as the court goes on to conflate it 
                                                          
161 Chan Sek Keong, “The Courts and the ‘Rule of Law’ in Singapore” [2012] Sing 
JLS 209 at 214, discussing Art 93 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 
(1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint). 
162 c 42 (UK). 
163 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(213 UNTS 222) (4 November 1950; entry into force 3 September 1953); Human 
Rights Act 1998 (c 42) (UK) s 3. See Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 
for a striking example of the extent of such “interpretation” possible. 
164 Human Rights Act 1998 (c 42) (UK) s 4. 
165 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 at [107]. 
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with the “common law tradition of positivism”. It is true that “laws 
declared by Parliament are valid by virtue of their enactment”, as is the 
case in the UK – this is one part of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. However, parliamentary sovereignty goes further and holds 
that such laws can never be rendered invalid by the courts; this is 
certainly not the case in Singapore.166 
81 Seen in this light, it is at least arguable that, at common law, 
the courts have the power to strike down legislation for reasons other 
than explicitly spelt out in the Constitution. This can take place by 
means of expansive interpretation of the words of the Constitution 
(eg, interpreting the word “law” to mean “a system of law which 
incorporates … fundamental rules of natural justice”).167 Might it, 
however, also cover grounds not explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution, such as those which currently apply to judicial review of 
administrative action such as irrelevant considerations, improper 
purposes and pure irrationality?168 After all, it must be remembered that 
the Singapore courts’ power of judicial review has been said to extend to 
“legislative and executive” acts;169 it would logically follow that the 
grounds of review may well be the same for both. 
82 In short, the High Court’s test of legitimacy of purpose and the 
Court of Appeal’s test of unreasonableness of differentia would both, 
taken to their logical conclusions, allow any statute to be struck down 
for having an illegitimate purpose simply by nominally invoking 
Art 12(1) without actually grappling with the concept of equality 
(assuming the plaintiff can meet the threshold of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness).170 This would be an odd claim to make under a 
constitutional provision relating to equality, but it might be arguable 
that it is supportable independently of Art 12. If this proposition sounds 
striking – and it is certainly unprecedented – it may well be worth 
exploring in more detail elsewhere. 
VII. Conclusion: The proper role of the courts 
83 A number of difficult issues which have faced the courts have 
been looked at, many of which go beyond the issue of Art 12(1) to, 
                                                          
166 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 4. 
167 Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710 at [26]. 
168 See generally Lines International Holdings (S) Pte Ltd v Singapore Tourist 
Promotion Board [1997] 1 SLR(R) 52 and Chee Siok Chin v Minister for Home 
Affairs [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582. 
169 Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 
1 SLR(R) 294 at [50], cited in Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 
3 SLR 118 at [116]. 
170 See para 24 above. 
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indeed, the very roots of the Constitution; critiques have been offered 
suggesting that the courts’ reasoning may not form a complete 
justification for the outcome of the case (though this is not to say that 
the outcome was therefore necessarily wrong). That having been said – 
and the Court of Appeal seems, from its focus on the relative 
institutional roles of the courts and the Legislature as a unifying theme, 
to have recognised this – it might well be that the most difficult problem 
is not so much how to translate these theoretical issues into a practical 
procedure, but rather who should take the lead. 
84 On this note, notwithstanding that Loh J said that the instant 
case concerned “defining moral issues” which “need time to evolve and 
are best left to the Legislature to resolve”,171 there is a hint that he would 
not have completely ruled out court-led law reform in future. He 
mentioned legislative reform as having secured the abolition of the 
common-law tort of enticement in Singapore and civil war as having 
secured the end of slavery in the US, but also judge-led reform to the 
common law in barring racial segregation in US schools.172 What, for 
him, would have tipped the balance and allowed the courts to take the 
lead on reforming the law on sexual orientation? Would it have been a 
large change in societal views, as with race relations in the US? Or 
would it have been a statute with a much more drastic impact on 
homosexuals, such as an actively enforced statute mandating segregation 
in schools based on sexual orientation? 
85 By contrast, in declaring that the courts must not act as 
“mini-legislatures”, the Court of Appeal drew a stronger institutional 
demarcation between the courts and the Legislature. Whereas Loh J’s 
approach suggests that there are matters which the court can in principle 
review but in practice will be unable to, the Court of Appeal’s approach 
would hold that the court should not even try to review such matters. 
Yet, as has been seen above, the Court of Appeal also appears willing to 
change its stance in “extreme” cases. 
86 Therefore, in conclusion, perhaps the key question – which 
extends beyond the issue of Art 12(1) to judicial review more generally – 
is whether the response to extreme cases should be to change the legal 
test as and when those cases come up (as a reaction), or rather to change 
the test now (in a pre-emptive manner). Ultimately, this comes down to 
Singapore’s constitutional order: Does the law lead politics, or does 
politics lead law? As has been mentioned, the Court of Appeal remarked 
                                                          
171 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [142]. 
172 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [139]–[141]. 
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recently in Jeyaretnam that, following the “green-light” model of 
constitutions, the answer might be closer to the latter.173 
87 Moreover, the Court of Appeal remarked that the question of 
what is the proper philosophy that should be taken to outline the proper 
limits of legislation is itself a question for the Legislature174 – in other 
words, not only the courts,175 but also the Legislature, have Kompetenz-
Kompetenz of sorts: there is an implicit understanding of the proper 
relative role of the two, but it is amorphous and subject to change in 
“extreme” cases – and what is “extreme” is hardly settled. There is 
therefore latent tension between the two of a complex nature as both 
have powers to define the scope of their own powers. 
88 The upshot may therefore be that, even if the courts could have 
gone further than they did in the instant cases without violating 
Singapore’s constitutional law and overstepping their boundaries 
(contrary to what they, particularly the Court of Appeal, held), and even 
if the Legislature did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the issues 
behind s 377A, the result that the Legislature should still take the leading 
role may well be justified on the grounds that legislation is often better 
at upholding what Yowell calls the “virtue of clarity” as its law-making 
activity need not be piecemeal in nature (whereas judicial law-making 
involves a tension between the desirability of potentially far-reaching 
changes to the law and the desirability of prospectivity)176 – provided 
that this leading role takes the form not only of going into detail on 
legislation regulating public morality, but also detail on the limits to 
such legislation (consider, for example, the leading role of some foreign 
legislatures and constitution-framers in developing comprehensive 
systems of equality and discrimination laws, in some cases thereby 
limiting the scope of legislative powers).177 Either that, or much more 
work needs to be done on the definitions of complex but foundational 
concepts such as judicial power, legislative power, legislative intent and 
legislative purpose – and it will probably fall to the courts, as the leading 
interpreters of general constitutional law, to do it. The former may well 
turn out to be easier in practice as a means of resolving the particular 
                                                          
173 See n 5 above. 
174 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [169]. 
175 As has been seen at paras 5–11 above. 
176 Paul Yowell, “Legislation, Common Law, and the Virtue of Clarity” in Modern 
Challenges to the Rule of Law (Richard Ekins ed) (Wellington: LexisNexis 
New Zealand, 2011) at pp 123–128. 
177 See generally Sandra Fredman, Comparative Study of Anti-discrimination and 
Equality Laws of the US, Canada, South Africa and India (Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 2012) at pp 13–19, which 
outlines change led by the Legislature in the US, Canada and South Africa; and the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. See also the UK Equality 
Act 2010 (c 15). 
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dispute before the courts, but only the latter can provide a watertight 
foundation for the further development of the jurisprudence on 
Art 12(1), as well as other areas of constitutional adjudication, in the 
long run. 
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